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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL JORGENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a 
corporation, and AETNA 
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 17621 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action filed by Plaintiff against Defendant 
John Clay & Co. alleging a breach of a contract to supply 
sheep. Plaintiff alleged that he had been damaged in 
excess of $160,000 by the failure of defendant John Clay 
& Co. to perform under a written contract for the purchase 
of approximately 6,000 sheep. In addition, Plaintiff 
sought damages against defendant Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. as a surety on a stock purchase bond. Finally, 
Plaintiff sought attorneys' fees as to both defendants and 
punitive damages as to defendant John Clay & Co. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Complaint of Plaintiff was filed in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court on July 12, 1979. (R. 1-4). On 
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September 17, 1979 Defendants filed a .Motion for Change of 1 
Venue asking the case be transferred from Sanpete county 
to Weber County, the principal place of business of John 
Clay & Co. (R. 11). After extensive argument in the 
district court the Motion for Change of Venue was denied 
on November 6, 1979. (R. 44). 
Thereafter, an Answer was filed by Defendant including 
a claim that venue had been improperly laid. (R. 39-41). 
In addition, a Counterclaim was filed against the plaintiff 
by defendant John Clay & Co. for its loss of commission. 
A jury trial was commenced on June 23, 1980 with the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs presiding. After five days of trial 
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in 
the amount of $191,463.40 as general damages and $1.00 as 
punitive damages. (R. 130). In addition, the jury found 
in favor of Plaintiff as to Defendant's Counterclaim, A 
judgment on the verdict was entered by the trial court on 
July 8, 1980. (Tr. 136-137) . 
On August 4, 1980 an appeal was filed to this Court 
from the judgment on the verdict. (R. 139). This court 
in Case No. 17228 remitted that appeal to the district 
court since the appeal was not from a final judgment because 
the question of interest and attorneys' fees had not yet 
been resolved. (R. 154). 
d · nterest 
After remand, the matter of attorneys' fees an 1 
-2-
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was submitted to the trial court as a trier of fact. on 
January 27, 1981 the lower court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and concluded, based upon the 
jury verdict, that the actions taken by defendant John Clay 
& Co. were malicious, willful and oppressive and therefore 
assessed attorneys' fees against Defendant in the sum of 
$21,400.00. In addition, the lower court assessed pre-
judgment interest of $14,822.37. (R. 195-200). 
Defendants then filed a Notice of Appeal in the instant 
case from the judgment on the verdict, and from the order 
of the lower court awarding interest and attorneys' fees. 
(R. 209). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal of the lower court verdict 
and judgment and a retrial of this case in Weber County 
on the basis that venue was improperly laid. In the alter-
native, Defendants seek a remittur in the amount of the 
attorneys' fees and pre-judgment interest assessed by the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are basically undisputed with 
the exception of several events which transpired concerning 
alleged interference by the plaintiff of the contractual 
obligations and the custom of the sheep industry concerning 
notification of the seller when lambs are to be transported. 
-3-
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Since this Court is obligated to view the evidence most 
favorably to the jury verdict and to the findings of the 
trial court Defendants will principally rely upon the 
evidence of the plaintiff throughout this brief. 
The plaintiff Neil Jorgensen testified that he was 
a resident of Mt. Pleasant, Utah and was engaged in the 
livestock business of raising and storing lambs. (Tr. SO), 
He had been doing this for ten years and had been working 
with the defendant John Clay & Co. for a number of years, 
(Tr. 53-56). 
John Clay & Co. is a Utah corporation with its principa: 
place of business in Ogden, Utah. Its function is to purchas; 
lambs from growers and to resell them to packers with the 
company receiving a commission for its efforts. (Tr. 694, 
696). 
Mr. Leon Sparrow was a lamb buyer for defendant John 
Clay & Co. who had dealt with the plaintiff for over ten 
years prior to the transactions involved in this litigation. 
(Tr. 53-54). In November of 1978 the plaintiff and Mr. 
I Sparrow entered into a contract whereby John Clay & co. 
. I 
would purchase 5, 000 lambs at 65 cents per pound at a maximUJU ', 
I 
(Exhibit 16). A "weight stop" I 
is a device used in the industry which puts a weight limi-
"weight stop" of 120 pounds. 
tation on each lamb so that any excess weight is not paid 
for by the buyer. (Tr. 63). There was no dispute as to 
-4-
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this first contract except as to whether 274 lambs subse-
quently purchased were properly included under the terms 
of this contract or should have been included under the 
terms of the subsequent 10,000 sheep contract. 
The 10,000 sheep contract was entered into between the 
parties John Clay & Co. and Plaintiff on December 13, 1978. 
(Defendant's Exhibit l; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). This agree-
ment, also in writing, called for an additional 10,000 lambs 
to be purchased by John Clay & Co. at 70 cents per pound 
with no weight stop limitation. 
Since this contract will be discussed in detail during 
the Argument portion of this brief further elaboration as to 
the details is unnecessary at this point except for the fact 
that the sheep designated in that contract were pastured 
in Blythe, California. (Tr. 67). 
At the end of December in 1978 the plaintiff called 
Leon Sparrow and informed him that because of severe weather 
conditions in Blythe, California causing an inadequacy of 
feed, it was necessary for him to move the majority of his 
herd if they were to survive. (Tr. 71, 306). Sparrow 
said he would see if he could find a place to move the lambs 
until they were ready for delivery under the contract. (Tr. 
307). 
Subsequently, sparrow called the plaintiff and informed 
him that a feed yard in Ault, Colorado could accomodate 
-5-
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Plaintiff's herd. (Tr. 71) . The parties agreed to trans· 
port the sheep to the Marvin Weber feed yard in Ault, 
Colorado with John Clay & Co. paying the additional freight 
at the time of final delivery. (Tr. 73). This location 
was particularly convenient since defendant John Clay 
Co. had resold the 10,000 lambs to a packer known as 
Monfort of Colorado which had its packing plant within six 
miles of the feed yard location. (Exhibit 17; Tr. 72). 
During January of 1979 the plaintiff made arrangements 
for the transportation of the 10,000 lambs to the Weber feed 
yard. Simultaneously, he was shipping lambs pursuant to the 
65 cent contract from a Cedar City herd and from the Blythe, 
California herd as to those lambs which were ready for 
slaughter. (Tr. 76-77). 
On or about February 10 the plaintiff received a call 
from Sparrow informing him that approximately 2,400 lambs 
had been shipped out on February 5, 6 and 7 to the Monfort 
Packing Plant and giving Plaintiff various weights and dollar 
figures. (Tr. 77, 321-323). It was undisputed by the 
parties that the plaintiff became very upset upon learning 
about this shipment and told Sparrow that the plaintiff 
should have been notified as to the shipment date which was 
customary in the industry so that he could be there if he 
desired. (Tr. 324). 
A dispute developed in the testimony of the witnesses 
-6-
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as to whether Plaintiff had agreed that the packer Monfort 
could take the sheep at its discretion without notification 
to the plaintiff or whether the customary notification had 
to be made. Sparrow stated that he reminded the plaintiff 
of the prior agreement upon receiving the phone call but 
that Plaintiff kept insisting that he was entitled to 
notification. (Tr. 324). Plaintiff, on the other hand, 
denied that there was ever any agreement that he would 
not be notified when the lambs were to be taken. (Tr. 68). 
In any case, it was undisputed that Sparrow agreed 
to notify the plaintiff as to the dates of the next shipment. 
(Tr. 324). The plaintiff also called Weber, the feed lot 
operator, and told him that the plaintiff would notify 
Weber when the lambs were to be shipped. (Tr. 83). The 
plaintiff also stated that he called Wadlington, the lamb 
buyer for the packer Monfort, and told him not to ship the 
lambs without the plaintiff being present. (Tr. 83). 
Mr. Weber testified that during that same conversation 
Plaintiff told Weber not to ship the lambs out since he 
did not feel they weighed enough until the week of February 
20th. (Tr. 426). Wadlington testified that he received a 
call from Plaintiff to the same effect that Plaintiff should 
have been notified before shipment and that he did not want 
any more lambs of his taken out before February 20th. (Tr. 
591). Plaintiff denied telling either Weber or Wadlington 
-7-
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not to ship the lambs out until February 20th and stated 
that he only asked that he be advised as to when the 
shipments were to be made. (Tr. 757). 
On the 13th of February the plaintiff made a personal 
trip to Colorado with his family to check on the sheep. 
As they were driving by the Monfort Packing Plant the plain-
tiff recognized Wadlington and pulled over and talked to him, 
The plaintiff testified that Wadlington apologized for not 
notifying the witness about the shipment of lambs and said 
he would make sure that the plaintiff would be notified in 
the future. The plaintiff then went to the Weber feeding 
lot in Ault, Colorado and saw that the lambs were in good 
condition. (Tr. 86-88). 
On February 21 the plaintiff received a call from 
Sparrow informing him that the lambs had been taken to the 
packing plant for the past several days. Sparrow told the 
plaintiff that 695 lambs had been shipped during the precedir,, 
days. Again, the plaintiff proclaimed that he should have 
been notified about the prior shipments and told Sparrow 
that it was a poor way to run a business in not notifying 
the seller. (Tr. 89). Sparrow testified that he did oot 
apologize on this occasion for not notifying the plaintiff 
since the plaintiff had set his own shipping date and that 
it was his own fault for not being there because the plaintif: 
1 
knew the lambs were going out the week of the 20th. 
(Tr. Jkj 
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lllU1\ediately after talking to Sparrow the plaintiff 
called Weber, the feed lot operator, who informed the 
plaintiff that according to his records 1,096 sheep had been 
shipped out. (Tr. 89). Plaintiff then called Wadlington 
who confirmed the 695 figure. (Tr. 90). 
The witness called Weber and told him not to ship out 
any more sheep until the plaintiff arrived at the feed yard 
the next morning. He illU1lediately made a reservation to 
fly to Greeley, Colorado. (Tr. 90). On the following 
morning, however, because of a blizzard, the plaintiff 
was unable to catch the plane and called Weber and told 
him to ship the lambs even without the plaintiff being 
present. (Tr. 91, 133). 
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff called the Monfort 
Packing Plant and requested the number and weight of the 
sheep shipped during the week of February 20. The secretary 
who answered the phone told him that 1,096 sheep had been 
sent but told him that she could not give him the weights 
of the lambs. The plaintiff told her that he would contact 
the government agency supervising packer houses to obtain 
the information if necessary. (Tr. 94-96). 
It is uncontroverted that after the shipment of lambs 
during the week of February 20 no further lambs were removed 
from the Weber feeding yard pursuant to the 10,000 lamb 
contract. Plaintiff testified that on March 3 he received 
-9-
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a call from Sparrow that Defendant could no longer accept 
the lambs which were remaining at the feed yard. Sparrow 
told the witness that the packer, Monfort, had refused to 
accept any more lambs because of the interference in the 
shipping dates caused by the plaintiff. (Tr. 100,391). 
Plaintiff immediately contacted his attorney, Clark Nielsen, 
and a letter was sent to defendant John Clay & Co. warning 
that it would be held accountable for any failure to perform 
under the contract. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). 
Sparrow suggested that he and the plaintiff go to 
Colorado and meet with the Monfort people to see if the 
matter could be resolved. Accordingly, the plaintiff and 
his son met Sparrow and drove to the Monfort Packing Plant. 
When they arrived Bob Quam, the vice president in charge of 
lamb procurement for Monfort, was not present. They left 
and returned the following day. (Tr. 101-102). 
At that time Quam stated that there had been too much 
interference in the shipment of the lambs and that the 
company could not afford to continue under the present 
agreement. He said a new deal would have to be made among 
the parties. (Tr. 332). Quam also told the plaintiff that 
any deal was with John Clay & Co. as far as Monfort was 
concerned and not with the plaintiff. (Tr . 10 3 ) . Sparrow 
and the plaintiff left the meeting with no deal having been 
worked out. 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The next day Raymond Williams, a co-owner of defendant 
John Clay & Co., and Frank Rynders, the manager and 
secretary-treasurer of the defendant, arrived in Colorado 
to assist in working out the problem. Upon arrival, a 
meeting was held at which time it was decided that Williams 
and Rynders should go to the Monfort Packing Plant to see 
what could be resolved. (Tr. 715). 
Williams returned from the plant and said that Monfort 
was willing to purchase the lambs at 60 cents per pound with 
a 120 pound weight stop since the lambs were now heavier than 
commercially desirable. (Tr. 106, 757). The witness said 
that he would not accept this price since had had a contract 
with John Clay & Co. and was entitled to receive 70 cents 
with no weight limitation. (Tr. 107). 
Subsequently, Mr. Rynders telephoned the plaintiff when 
he returned h:Jrre and said that Monfort would agree to pay 63 
cents and John Clay would pay 3 more cents making a total of 
66 cents with a 120 pound stop. (Tr. 107, 757). No mention 
as to a release was made at that time. (Tr. 107). 
Plaintiff stated that he told Williams and Rynders 
that if they wanted to honor their contract they would have 
to call the next morning or otherwise he would sell his 
sheep to R. H. Rock co. (Tr. 108). When he did not receive 
a call from the defendant he entered into a deal with Rock 
Co. to sell the remaining 6,283 sheep. Plaintiff claimed 
-11-
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• 
that as a result of that sale and the failure of Defendant 
to proceed with its contract he suffered a loss of $166,566 ,:: 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 10). Plaintiff admitted, however, that 
had he taken the offer made by defendant Clay & Co. he would 
have received substantially more money. (Tr. 140-142), 
The above statement of facts is a synopsis of the testi· 
mony during the five-day trial. Additional issues were raise' 
at the trial concerning the accuracy of the various records, 
the method of shipping the sheep, the custom and practice o~ 
notifying the seller when shipment is to be made, and other 
issues not germane to the present appeal. In addition, 
Defendants offered evidence that the interference by Plaint:: 
in the shipment dates of the sheep impaired the ability of 
Monfort to schedule its daily kill and allowed the sheep to 
become too heavy for commercial acceptance. 
The matter was submitted to the jury which obviously 
concluded that Plaintiff had not interferred with the per-
formance of the contract and held John Clay & Co. liable 
for the difference in the price obtained for the remaining 
lambs, for the cost of freight to the Colorado area, and for 
the difference in price as to 274 sheep between 65 cents a 
pound and 70 cents a pound. The jury returned a verdict of 
general damages for $191,463.40. (Tr. 130). In addition, 
the jury returned a verdict of $1. 00 against Defendant for 
punitive damages. It was agreed that defendant Aetna 
casuai'. 
-12-
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& Surety Co. was liable up to the extent of its $75,000.00 
bond in the event that liability was assessed against John 
Clay & Co. 
After the jury verdict was returned and after remand 
from this Court, Judge Tibbs heard argument as to whether 
attorneys' fees should be assessed against the defendants 
and whether pre-judgment interest should also be assessed. 
The lower court entered its own Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and awarded an additional $21,400.00 in 
attorneys' fees and $14,822.37 in pre-judgment interest. 
(R. 216-220). 
It is from the jury verdict and the lower court judgment 
that this appeal is now taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO CHANGE VENUE AND TRIAL TO 
WEBER COUNTY. 
The Complaint in this matter was filed on July 12, 1979 
in the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete County. The 
Complaint alleged that Plaintiff was a resident of Sanpete 
County and that defendant John Clay & Co. was a corporation 
organized under the laws of the State of Utah with its 
principal place of business in Ogden, Utah. (R. 1). 
On September 17, 1979 defendant John Clay & Co. moved 
.,. r for a change of venue based upon the affidavit of Lewis E. 
!l· 
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Harper and upon the attached agreement which was the basis 
of Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 11-14). No other responsive 
pleading had been filed prior to the Motion for Change of 
Venue. The parties argued this question extensively in the 
lower court and on November 6, 1979 the Honorable Don v. 
Tibbs entered an order denying Defendant's motion. Subse-
quently, an Answer was filed on behalf of defendant John Cla; j 
& Co. also raising the question of improper venue. (R. 40), I 
The venue laws of Utah have remained substantially I 
unchanged since Utah became a territory in the late 1800's. , 
This Court has recognized that the failure to transfer venue 
when the facts are clear and when properly demanded is a 
substantial right and that it is reversible error to deny 
such a transfer. Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 
216 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1923). 
The laws of Utah regarding venue are divided into two 
distinct classes. First, those cases mandating transfer 
under specific conditions and, second, those cases in which 
the discretion of the court is invoked. In the first class 
of case a court must transfer venue in certain actions i 
respecting real property, in actions involving public office:' I 
in actions against a county, in actions on written contract 
and in certain transitory causes of action. See §§78-13-l, 
u.c.A. through 78-13-6, u.c.A. 
The second class of venue statute involves discretion 
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in cases where the court believes that an impartial trial 
cannot be had, where a change is required because of the 
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice, or 
where all parties stipulate such a change should be made. 
§78-13-9, U.C.A. In such cases a great deal of discretion 
is left to the trial court. Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Railway Co., 221 P.2d 628 (Utah 1949). 
In the instant case defendant John Clay & Co. moved to 
transfer venue to Weber County, its principal place of 
business, on the basis of the mandatory provisions of 
§78-13-4, U.C.A. and §78-13-7, U.C.A. These sections 
state the following: 
78-13-4. Actions on Written Contracts. When 
the defendant has contracted in writing to perform 
an obligation in a particular county of the state 
and resides in another county, an action on such 
contract obligation may be commenced in the county 
where such obligation is to be performed or in 
which the defendant resides. 
78-13-7. All Other Actions. In all other 
cases the action must be tried in the county in 
which the cause of action arises, or in the county 
in which any defendant resides at the cornrnencement 
of the action; provided, that if any such defendant 
is a corporation, any county in which such corpora-
tion has its principal office of place of business 
shall be deemed the county in which such corporation 
resides within the meaning of this Section. 
This Court in a series of decisions beginning in 1923 
has interpreted these sections in such a manner that there 
can be no doubt that venue in this case was improperly laid. 
The foundational case concerning this type of venue 
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problem is Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 216 P.l: 
684 (Utah 1923). In that case the plaintiff, a resident of 
Salt Lake County, brought an action against a resident of 
Weber County for collection of a debt on an oral contract. 
After a trial had been held in Salt Lake County and a 
verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff the defendant 
appealed. 
This Court interpreted the predecessor of the two 
above stated sections and concluded that for §78-13-4 (then 
§6528) to be applicable there must be a written contract in 
effect. If there is no written contract then §78-13-7 
(then §6531) is applicable. The court noted that in soch 
cases it is mandatory to try the action at the residence of 
the defendant since the words "where the cause of action 
arises" are referrable "to cases not on contracts, because 
the venue on actions on contracts, in respect of where they 
arise, is disposed of by §6528, as above interpreted." .!!. 
at 686. 
This Court stated the policy reasons behind the venue 
statutes and why they must be narrowly construed in favor o: 
bringing an action at the residence of the defendant. 
Court stated: 
Requiring persons sued to defend legal . 
actions at places remote from where they reside 
exposes them to an expense and disadva~tage 
manifestly unjust, and to avoid such mischief 
the general modern tendency is to fix the venue 
-16-
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of transitory actions at the residence of the 
defendant. By giving a sensible and effective 
meaning to all the provisions of the statutes 
and considering them together, the only ' 
rational conclusion is that the Legislature intended 
to establish the general right of persons sued to 
have the action tried in the county where one of 
them resides, and that the action which may be 
tried elsewhere are limited and restricted to 
those which the statute itself excepts from 
the general rule. Id. at 685-686. 
The next case of substance was decided by this Court in 
1934. In Atlas Acceptance Corp. v. Pratt, District Judge, 
39 P.2d 710 (Utah 1944) an action was brought by an automobile 
dealer against a buyer of an automobile for a balance owing 
upon the car. The contract sued upon was in writing. The 
defendant argued that he was entitled to be sued in his own 
county. The Court agreed and stated: 
When an action is brought in a county other 
than the county of the defendant's residence, he 
is entitled to a change of venue to the county of 
his residence, unless the case comes within the 
exceptions enumerated in the statute, one of 
which is that when the defendant contracted in 
writing to perform the obligation in a particular 
county of the state and resides in another county. 
In such case to bar the defendant from having the 
case transferred for trial to the county of his 
residence it must expressly or by necessary 
implication be made to appear on the face of the 
contract itself that the obligation was to be 
performed in the county where the action was 
brought. Id. at 285. (Emphasis in original). 
The court went on to define the term "necessary implication" 
as so strong a probability of intention that an intention 
contrary to that which is imputed cannot be supposed. 
Shortly thereafter this Court in Floor v. Mitchell, 
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41 P.2d 281 (Utah 1935) affirmed a transfer of venue from 
Salt Lake County to Iron County. The court upheld the 
transfer to the defendant's residence. This Court stated 
that in order for a suit to be brought in Salt Lake County 
it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that the writte~ 
contract on its face required performance in Salt Lake City. 
This Court stated, "Mere reference to residence or place 
of business having no reference to performance is not suffi· 
cient." This Court then stated: 
The contract sued upon was for a "Talking 
Picture Reproducing Equipment" to be installed 
in Parowan, Iron County, Utah. The contract 
itself is silent as to where it was made. 
Performance as to the executory part of 
installation was to be at Parowan. The place 
of business of the National Filmphone Corpora-
tion is shown to be in Salt Lake City. The 
contract is also silent as to the place of payment. 
The contract does not expressly state the place 
of performance, nor within the four corners of 
the contract is there any reference to place of 
performance from which by necessary implication 
the place of payment may be determined. With such 
situation the only alternative is the defendants 
were entitled to have the action brought at or 
transferred to the place of their residence. 
Id. at 284. 
An examination of the contract sued upon in this case 
is no different from that mentioned in the ~ case. 
The contract states that John Clay & Co. "of Ogden, Utah" 
and Neil Jorgensen "of Mt. Pleasant, Utah" agree for 
$20, 000 down and $. 70 per pound to the purchase and sale 
of 10,000 lambs. It then continues that "the lambs are 
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on pasture in the Blythe, California area. They are to be 
sorted at daylight the morning of delivery, loaded on the 
trucks and weighed on the trucks at their scale. Delivery 
to be F.O.B. truck subject to buyer being able to bill 
through to destination between the 1st day of January, 1979 
and the 15th day of March, 1979." The contract then contains 
the signature of both parties. 
An examination of Exhibit 1 shows that it does not 
either expressly or by necessary implication appear on 
the face of the contract itself that the obligation was to 
be performed in Sanpete County. There is no mention what-
soever in the contract as to where payment would be made. 
While the sheep were kept in Blythe, California there is no 
indication that this area was deemed as the county of 
performance. Thus, the contract itself is ambiguous since 
the buyer is from Ogden, Utah, the seller is from Mt. Pleasant, 
Utah, and the sheep are maintained in Blythe, California. 
As such, the defendant was entitled to a venue change to 
Weber County, its principal place of business. 
This contention is further supported by other cases of 
this Court. In Palfreyman v. Truman, 142 P.2d 677 (Utah 1943) 
an action was commenced in weber County against the defendant 
who had contracted in writing with the plaintiff to pay them 
for certain work done as to cement foundations. The defen-
dant resided in Utah county. The lower court denied the 
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defendant's motion to transfer venue. Upon appeal, this 
Court reversed. 
This Court analyzing the facts of that case stated: 
The Complaint in the instant case is based 
on an alleged failure of defendant to make a proper 
accounting and to pay to plaintiff the net proceeds 
due him under the contract. In reading the contract 
it appears that no particular place is specified 
where the accounting is to take place nor where 
the payment is to be made. If respondent is to 
prevail it must be because the necessary impli-
cations of the express terms of the contract show 
that the accounting or payment are to be made in 
Weber County. 
As shown above, plaintiff's obligations were 
contemplated by the contract to be performed at or 
near Ogden, Utah, and an office was to be maintained 
at or near the place of construction. It is from 
these two terms that the necessary implications 
must stern that the accounting and payment, which 
were defendant's obligations, were to take place 
in Ogden, Utah. Id. at 679. 
In concluding that the maintenance of an office and the 
performance of the work in Ogden, Utah was insufficient to 
show or imply the place of performance this Court stated: 
Offices are maintained for a variety of 
reasons and not every office is a place where 
payment or accounting must necessarily be made. 
There is nothing on the face of the contract 
from which it can be determined where the 
separate banking account was to be opened. It 
is just as reasonable to infer that said account 
was to be opened in a bank located in the county 
in which defendant resides or any other place as 
it is to infer that it is to be opened in Weber 
County. Because the terms of the contract do 
not expressly provide the place where defendant 
is to perform his obligations and since there is. 
nothing in the terms from which it must neces7anlY 
be implied that they be performed in any part1culard 
place, it follows that the court should have grante 
the motion for a change of venue. Id. at 679. 
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The action in Palfreyman was for an accounting of 
profit. The action in the present case was for the loss of 
a contract bargain. In both cases the contracts did not 
specify where the accounting or where the payments were to 
be made. Thus, venue is proper in the defendant's county. 
The case of Simmons v. Hoyt, 167 P.2d 27 (Utah 1946) 
is remarkedly similar to the instant case. In that case a 
note was executed in St. George, Washington County, Utah 
between the plaintiff and the defendants. The note stated 
that the plaintiff lender was "of Cedar City, Utah" and 
listed "P. 0. St. George, Utah" next to the signature of 
the borrowers-defendants. 
An action was commenced in Washington County against 
defendants who moved to transfer venue to Utah County, the 
place of their residence. The defendants alleged that venue 
in Washington County was improper since the note on its face 
did not expressly provide for payment in a particular county. 
In concluding that the case should be transferred to 
Utah County this Court reviewed the previous decisions men-
tioned above and stated the following: 
In the case at bar, however, the implications 
that respondent would have us apply is not one 
arising out of any necessary intendment of the terms 
of the note. At the bottom of the note the following 
words appear: "P. o. St. George, Utah Phone 184." 
The only other reference to place is the recitation 
of the residence of J. J. Miller, the payee: "J. J. 
Miller of Cedar City, Utah." From neither of t~ese 
can it be said, as a factual implication, that it 
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was necessarily intended that performance in a 
particular county was within the contemplation 
of the parties. If the place of performance is 
of importance to the parties, they will not 
leave the evidence of their belief in its 
importance to a legal fiction founded upon the acts 
of contracting parties generally. Id. at 28. 
(Emphasis added) . 
More recently, this Court in Olympia Sales Co. v. Long, 
604 P.2d 919 (Utah 1979) reaffirmed the statutory venue sche,,, 
and held that a defendant, as a matter of right, was entitlec 
to transfer a lawsuit against him to his residence in an 
action involving an oral contract. This Court reviewed the I 
previous cases and cited together with §78-13-7 and §78-13-4, ; 
U .C .A. and reaffirmed the previous holdings of this Court 
that venue should be transferred to the defendant's residence 
unless a clear exception was indicated. 
Finally, as recently as May 20 of this year in~ 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, No. 17101 (May 20, 1981 Utah) th:0 ' 
! 
Court reversed a change of venue from Salt Lake County to 
Cache County when it was established that the contract 
itself showed "defendant's contract performance (payment) 
was due at the plaintiff's main office in Salt Lake City." 
The court concluded that since the plaintiff had the option 
of suing in either the defendant's residence or at the 
place of performance it was erroneous for the lower court 
to trans fer venue from Salt Lake County when that had been 
the place of payment and performance. 
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The preceding cases amply illustrate that the lower 
court erred in refusing to initially transfer this matter 
from Sanpete County to Weber County. There is no doubt 
that except for Plaintiff having his residence in Sanpete 
County there is nothing in the contract even referring to 
Sanpete County. Since Plaintiff is seeking money damages 
for an alleged breach of contract in failure to make payment 
it is clear that unless the contract specifically provided 
where payment was to be made that the general rule allowing 
a defendant to be sued in his own county should have prevailed. 
In the instant case Defendants maintained that Plaintiff 
had unnecessarily interferred with the performance of the 
contract by delaying the delivery of the sheep to the packer. 
This in turn caused the packer to breach its obligation with 
defendant John Clay & Co. in refusing to take any further lambs 
because of their excessive weight. Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, maintained that he never delayed any shipments and 
only asked to be notified when shipments were to be made so 
he could be present. 
The jury in this case (in the plaintiff's county) con-
cluded that Plaintiff was telling the correct version of the 
story and therefore found fully in favor of Plaintiff's 
claim. Defendant, however, was entitled to have these same 
questions submitted to a jury in its own county and, while 
the verdict is no doubt supported by the evidence in the 
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record, it would be equally supportable for a jury in Webe· 
County to have found the opposite result. 
Since defendant John Clay & Co. was deprived of a suJ;. 
stantial right to trial in Weber County and since it timel; 
and consistently moved for removal to the correct county, 
it is now proper for this Court, just as in the initial 
Buckle v. Ogden Furniture case, to reverse the existing 
judgment and to order a new trial in the proper county. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT VENUE WAS PROPER, THE 
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
SUBMITTING THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO 
THE JURY AND IN SUBSEQUENTLY AWARDING ATTORNEYS' 
FEES WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF MALICIOUS 
OR WILLFUL INTENT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT 
JOHN CLAY & CO. 
Plaintiff in his Complaint made the following allegatic: 
1 
Said acts and conduct of defendant John Clay 
& Co. were willful, malicious and deliberate and 
done with the purpose of harrassing and intimidating 
plaintiff to accept less than the full amount of the 
purchase price for said lambs for which plaintiff 
is entitled to recover punitive damages in the sum 
of $100, 000 together with attorneys' fees and costs 
of this action. (R. 3). 
At the conclusion of the evidence Defendant's counsel 
moved to strike any claim for punitive damages on the basis 
that there was no evidence justifying such an award and no 
evidence of any tortious act causing any wrong justifying 
punitive damages. (Tr. 7 6 4) . The motion was denied· In 
addition, defense counsel objected to the giving of 
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Instruction No. 4 by the court concerning punitive damages 
and the submission of the issue to the jury. (Tr. 769). 
The jury verdict found in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants in the amount of $191,463.40 for 
general damages and "$1.00" for punitive damages. 
The trial court subsequently heard arguments and received 
evidence as to the propriety and amount of attorneys' fees 
claimed by Plaintiff's lawyers. In its "Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law" the trial court found that 
"the conduct of the defendant John Clay & Co. and its 
officers and employees was willful, malicious and oppressive 
as found by the jury. By reason of the willful, malicious 
and oppressive conduct of defendant John Clay & Co. and 
its officers and directors, plaintiff is entitled to a 
reasonable attorneys'_ fee for prosecuting this action." 
(Emphasis added) . (R. 216-217). 
The court further found that an attorneys' fee of 
$21,400.00 was reasonable which included "the sum of $1,400.00 
of costs and expenses incurred for airline and automobile 
travel, hotel and motel expense in connection with the 
trial and the taking of depositions in Greeley, Colorado." 
(R. 217). 
Thus, based upon an award of $1.00 in punitive damages 
the trial court assessed attorneys' fees and litigation 
costs of $21,400.00. The judgment as to the attorneys' fees, 
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litigation costs and to the $1.00 punitive damage cannot be 
substantiated in the evidence and must be reversed. 
It is the contention of Appellants-Defendants that 
the question of punitive damages should never have been 
submitted to the jury based upon the evidence adduced at 
trial. This Court on numerous occasions has defined the 
purpose and elements of punitive damages. In one such 
instance this Court stated: 
In considering the problem of punitive 
damages and the arguments thereon, it is well 
to have in mind the purpose of punitive damages. 
They are: a punishment of the defendant for 
particularly grievous injury caused by conduct 
which is not only wrongful, but which is willful 
and malicious so that it seems to one's sense 
of justice that mere recompense for actual loss 
is inadequate and that the plaintiff should 
have added compensation; and that the defendant 
should suffer some additional penalty for that 
character of wrongful conduct; and also that such 
a verdict should serve as a wholesome warning 
to others not to engage in similar misdoings. 
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975). 
See also, Holdaway v. Hall, 505 P.2d 295 (Utah 1973); 
I 
Elkinqt:'. 
=--1 
v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980). 1. 
Punitive damages are frequently awarded in intentional 
I 
tort cases or matters involving fraud and deceit. ~, ~' i 
Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 198 O) ; Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P. 2d 354 (Utah 1975); and 
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978). 
h d t ; 5 found If in a contract action, however, t e con uc ~ 
. h on tract to be wrongful in that it is a contravention of t e c 
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but is not willful or malicious then punitive damages 
cannot be awarded. Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1980). It is generally necessary, in a breach of contract 
case, to show an underlying tort for punitive damages to 
lie. See Allred v. Wick Construction Co., 614 P.2d 321 
(Alaska 1980); Tomen v. Kent Brown Chevrolet Co., 605 P.2d 
944 (Kan. 1980); Curtiss v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 560 P.2d 
169 (N. M. App. 1976); z. D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 
P. 2d 345 (Okla. 1975). 
This Court has recently held that under the Uniform 
Commercial Code all remedies for injuries are to be applied 
solely for compensation of actual losses and that no puni-
tive award are permitted. First Security Bank v. Utah Turkey 
Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980). In the same vein, 
this Court has found that poor workmanship in an aluminum 
siding contract did not justify the imposition of punitive 
damages and reversed an award given to an aggrieved plaintiff. 
Palombi v. D & c Builders, 542 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969). 
A review of the evidence in this case shows that there 
is no justification whatsoever for submitting the question of 
punitive damages to the jury. Since there was no contractual 
provision allowing for attorneys' fees, this Court's reversal 
of the jury award of $1.00 punitive damages would automa-
tically vacate the finding of the lower court awarding 
$21,400.00 in attorneys' fees. See Lyman Grazing Assn. v. 
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Smith, 473 P.2d 905 (Utah 1970); DeBry & Hilton Travel 
Service, Inc. v. Capitol International Interways, Inc., 
583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978). 
Viewing the evidence most favorably to the submission '1 
of punitive damages to the jury reveals the following: 
There was evidence showing that the defendant had promised 
to notify the plaintiff of the shipments of sheep to the 1 
Monfort Packing Plant but failed to do so on several occasiJ
1 
Upon protest about not receiving notification, Plaintiff 
testified that Defendant's vice president stated he would 
take Plaintiff's "God damn lambs whenever he wanted to." 
(Tr. 82). 
After the packing plant had notified defendant John 
Clay & Co. it was not going to receive any further lambs a 
meeting was held in Colorado between Mr. Sparrow, Mr. Williar: 
Plaintiff testified that Williams told and the plaintiff. 
him that he should 
I 
take his losses and forget about it if he : 
his business relationship with the defenda:·I wanted to maintain 
(R. 105). 
The plaintiff's son, Jeff, testified that during this 
meeting Williams appeared to be threatening his father to 
sue him or get him in trouble. (Tr. 255). He stated that 
his father upon being told this replied that the defendants 
were dealing with the wrong men and that they 
should go to 
hell and walked out of the room. (Tr. 272). 
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After a careful review of the transcript in this case, 
Defendants are unable to find any other testimony which 
even remotely goes to Plaintiff's claim that he was 
intimidated or harrassed to accept a lesser amount for 
his sheep than was originally agreed. Instead, both parties 
voiced their beliefs as to responsibility and attempted to 
compromise the crisis using various suggestions. Defendants 
challenge Plaintiff in his forthcoming brief to produce any 
evidence of active intimidation or harrassment. It is clear, 
from the preceding evidence, that such conversation and 
assertion of legal rights do not give rise to the type of 
conduct punitive damages were intended to prevent. 
On the other side of the coin, there is ample evidence 
to show the good faith of the defendant John Clay & Co. 
It is undisputed that upon learning of Plaintiff's trouble 
because of the feed situation in California, the defendant's 
aqent Sparrow made all the arrangements to move the sheep to 
the Denver feed yard. 
After the packer had informed defendant John Clay & Co. 
that it refused to take any more sheep, Sparrow arranged for 
a meeting in Colorado and attempted to compromise the problem 
with the packer's agent Bob Quam. (Tr. 101-102). Upon failing 
to do so Mr. Williams and Mr. Rynders, both executives in 
the defendant's company, also flew to Colorado in an attempt 
to work out the problem. (Tr. 103). 
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After being unable to persuade the packer Monfort to 
honor its contract with John Clay & Co., Defendant was 
able to obtain an additional 3 cent offer per pound from 
Monfort and agreed to put in 3 cents itself for a total of 
66 cents per pound in order to minimize Plaintiff's 
damages. (Tr. 107). 
Even after the plaintiff had rejected the offer of 
Defendant for the lambs, Plaintiff called Sparrow to see 
if he could help him in finding another buyer for the lambs. 
Plaintiff stated that Sparrow said he would help him as mucr. I 
as he could. (Tr. 183-185). ! 
Sparrow even told the plaintiff that he should sue \ 
John Clay & Co. for breaching its contract and that John 
Clay would then have to sue Monfort who actually caused 
the loss. (Tr. 339). 
The evidence, even assuming Plaintiff's version of the 
facts to be correct, unequivocally shows that at most, John 
Clay & Co. breached its contract to accept Plaintiff's 
sheep at the price of 70 cents per pound with no stop weight 
but that it attempted to minimize Plaintiff's losses as 
ke'll cause of such breach was the pac · much as possible since the 
Monfort's failure to honor its contract with defendant John I 
Clay & Co. Thus, defendant Clay & Co. was caught in the 
middle between the packer which refused to take Plaintiff's 
lambe and Plaintiff which had 6,000 lambs in a rapidly 
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declining market. 
It was erroneous for the lower court to submit the 
question of punitive damages to the jury. In spite of 
this, however, the jury itself saw no actions justifying 
punitive damages as evidenced by the $1.00 award it gave. 
The trial court, however, felt justified in awarding over 
$24,000 in attorneys' fees and travel costs because of the 
finding of this $1.00 award. 
Defendant does not dispute that in appropriate cases 
of punitive damages, attorneys' fees can be considered as 
an element of damages. DeBry & Hilton Travel, supra. 
However, this Court in a similar contract action, has 
reversed an award of only $200 attorneys' fees in a case where 
there was no basis for an award of punitive damages. Dahl 
v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951). Moreover, this Court 
has vacated an award of attorneys' fees in a declaratory 
judgment action where the controversy was bona fide and 
brought in good faith. western Casualty & Surety Co. v. 
Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980). And finally, this Court 
has noted that the amount of punitive damages must not be 
so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury 
that the verdict can be said to have been arrived at by 
passion or prejudice. Terry v. ZCMI, ~ra. 
Thus, even if it were assumed arguendo that the $1.00 
award for punitive damages was proper the subsequent judgment 
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of the lower court awarding some $24,000 in attorney's fee,! 
and travel costs based upon this $1.00 verdict was so 
excessive and unreasonable that the amount alone cannot be 
sustained. Any award of attorneys' fees and expenses must 
be based upon the proportion of punitive damages actually 
suffered rather than allowing the $1. 00 award to open the 
door to any claim and any amount of attorneys' fees and 
expenses. 
In summary, there is no evidence in this record justify· 
ing the submission of punitive damages to the jury and even 
the award of $1. 00 should be vacated. Because the parties ! 
did not contractually agree to pay attorneys' fees in this ' 
matter the award of attorneys' fees and litigation costs 
would then be automatically vacated. In the alternative, 
however, if punitive damages were justified then the amount 
of attorneys' fees and litigation expenses should be dras-
tically reduced in proportion to the punitive damages found 
by the jury. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT VENUE WAS PROPER, THE 
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST AS TO THE 
AMOUNT RECEIVED FOR THE REMAINING 6,283 LAMBS. 
The lower court entered Findings of Fact awarding 6% 
per annum interest from March 24, 1979 to the date of the 
jury verdict or a total of $14,822.37. 
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Defendant does not dispute that pre-judgment interest 
was proper as to that portion of the award made by the jury 
regarding freight charges between California and Colorado 
and the difference in price between 274 lambs at 65 cents 
compared to 70 cents per pound. In both instances these 
amounts were fixed and readily ascertainable. 
However, as to that portion of the interest award 
regarding the remaining 6,283 lambs and their subsequent sale 
the award was erroneous. This Court has held that for pre-
judgment interest to be awarded two factors must be established. 
First, the injury and consequent damages must be complete as 
of a date certain prior to trial and cannot be of a continuing 
nature; second, the damages must be ascertainable as of a 
date certain in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and 
known standards of value. Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 
88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907). 
This Court has subsequently held that pre-judment 
interest can be awarded if "the amount of the loss • • • can 
be measured by facts and figures" and "calculated with mathe-
matical accuracy," but may not be awarded if "the amount of 
the damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier 
of fact at the trial. " Bjork v. April Industries, Inc· , 
560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). See also Uintah Pipeline Corp. 
v. White Superior co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976); Jack B. 
Parson Construction Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976) 
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and State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 582 P. 101 (Utah 1978). ! 
The price paid for the sheep in this case under Exhibi'. I 
1, the contract of December 13, 1978, depended upon the I 
average weight of the sheep. Thus, while it was agreed to 
pay 70 cents per pound the total amount depended upon the 
curnulati ve weight of the sheep at each time of taking. It 
is undisputed that the amount paid to the plaintiff varied 
each time since the weight of the lambs upon each occasion 
also varied. 
Defendant claimed that because Plaintiff had forbidden I 
the shipment of the lambs during two occasions the packer wa; I 
forced to take lambs which were heavier than commercially 
feasible and that it was for this reason the packer declinec 
to take any further lambs. Had the jury found that Plaintii' 
had unduly delayed the shipment of these lambs such finding 
would have excused any breach on the part of Defendants or, 
in the alternative, would have fixed the damages to the 
weight which would have been obtained had Plaintiff not 
interferred with the shipping procedure. 
The contract in this case allowed the buyer John Clay 
& Co. to take the sheep anytime between January 1, 1979 and 
March 15, 1979. The contract between Clay and Monfort 
allowed the same dates. There was testimony throughout the 
trial that when a lamb reaches over 120 pounds it becomes 
much more difficult to commercially market because of the 
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extra fat on the various cuts of meat. (Tr. 508). As the 
weight goes above 120 pounds the meat becomes increasingly 
more difficult to sell and a discount must usually be given 
to the purchasers of the meat. 
Plaintiff calculated his damages in this case by 
totaling the 6,283 sheep and their cumulative weight and 
multiplying it by 70 cents. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 shows 
that Plaintiff "should have received" $607,773.30. Plaintiff 
then subtracted the "amount received" from Rock Co. of 
$441,166.60 resulting in a "loss" of $166,566.40. 
These figures clearly were not ascertainable until 
arrived at by the jury. As to the "amount should have received" 
Defendant argued that it was only liable up to 120 pounds 
which would have been the price taken had Plaintiff not 
interferred with the contract. An analysis of the actual 
weight of the lambs sold to Rock Co. from March 11 through 
March 24 shows that the lowest weight was 131 pounds and the 
highest weight was 147 pounds. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 9). 
Thus, Defendant was being charged for numerous pounds over 
the 120 pound mark which it claimed it was not liable for 
because of Plaintiff's interference. It was a jury question 
as to whether Defendant's defense was valid or not. 
Likewise, the "amount received" was also not "fixed" 
until the jury verdict was decided. This amount was based 
upon a contract with R. H. Rock Livestock based upon a sliding 
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scale accoring to the weight of the lambs. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8). Defendants maintained that this contract was 
not the commercially reasonable amount required to mitigate 
damages and that, in fact, the offer of Defendants at 66 
cents a pound with a 120 pound weight stop would have 
produced a greater amount. (Tr. 107, 141-142). It was thu; 
necessary for the jury to determine whether this was a 
reasonable price to receive for these lambs under the cir-
curnstances then existing. 
Because the amount of money due to Plaintiff varied 
by the weight of the lambs upon their taking there was no 
fixed or ascertainable formula which could be utilized for 
the assessment of pre-judgment interest. It was therefore 
erroneous for the lower court to award pre-judgment interest 
as to the damages claimed from the breach of the defendant 
in failing to purchase the some 6, 000 sheep of Plaintiff. 
This matter should therefore be remanded to the lower court 
for entry of pre-judgment interest as to the freight and 
274 lambs only. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the venue statutes is to insure the under· 
lying policy that a defendant should be tried in his own 
county unless there is a specific reason for allowing the 
trial elsewhere. In contract cases it is a simple matter 
. th· general to include in the agreement any exception to is 
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rule by merely stating where any suit can be brought. The 
decisions of this Court clearly establish the rule that 
absent such a showing on the face of the contract, defendants 
are entitled to defend the action in their own county. 
The lower court committed prejudicial error in refusing 
to transfer venue. 
Likewise, while punitive damages can justify attorney 
fees, there must be a showing that (1) punitive damages 
were justified and (2) that the attorney fees assessed are 
proportioned to the punitive actions of the wrongdoer. 
Here there was no evidence justifying either punitive 
damages or $20,000 attorney fees and $1,400 costs and 
expenses. 
Finally, pre-judgment interest should only be imposed 
when the amount is liquidated and submission to a trier of 
fact is unnecessary. Here, both the amount Defendant was 
liable for and the amount Plaintiff finally received were 
highly questionable and required a jury determination. In 
such a case pre-judgment interest was improper. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the judgment 
below should be vacated and a new trial ordered. In the 
alternative, the award of punitive damages, attorney fees 
and pre-judgment interest should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard Stein 
Richard Campbell 
STEIN & CAMPBELL 
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